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I. Introduction of the Euro into the European Union
In many ways, 1998 can be described as a year of positive surprises in the move toward
the third stage of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which commenced on
January 1, 1999. The year began with uncertainty over which nations would qualify for
participation in the first wave of entrants, and at what exchange rate, and with concern over
whether all necessary work would be completed in time to introduce the euro on January 1.
In the end, the countries that most people believed would qualify did indeed qualify. The
bilateral rate settings between the currencies of these countries survived volatility in the foreign
exchange markets remarkably unscathed, and the euro was launched with few operational
problems. Work on the legal aspects of introducing the new currency played a large role
in these successes. This article will examine some of the more important EMU-related legal
developments of 1998 and will look at the first month of the new currency's existence.
Probably the most important legislative development of 1998 was the adoption of the second
major EMU regulation by the Council of the European Union, EC No. 974/98 of 3 May
1998 or article 1091(4) regulation.' Unlike the previous EMU regulation,2 EC No. 1103/97
or the artide 235 regulation, which has the force of law in all fifteen states of the European
Union, the article 1091(4) regulation is law only in the eleven participating states. 3 The other
European Community states, however, should recognize its provisions under general principles
of international law, as should other countries in the world.
The article 1091(4) regulation accomplished several key objectives in establishing the legal
framework for the euro. Articles 2, 3, and 4 address the fundamental matters of installing the
new currency, in that they provide that the euro shall be the currency of each participating
state, that the euro shall be substituted for each of those currencies at the respective, irrevocably
fixed conversion rates, and that the euro will be the unit of account of the European Central
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1. Often referred to as the article 1091(4) regulation, after the provision in the Maastricht Treaty authorized
it. Council Regulation 974/98, 1998 OJ. (L 139) 1 [hereinafter Article 1091(4) regulation].
2. Council Regulation 1103/97, 1997 Oj. (L 162) 1.
3. See Article 1091(4) regulation art. 1.
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Bank and each central bank of the participating states.' Because euro bills and coins will not
be introduced until 2002 (in no small part due to the extraordinary amounts of each that have
to be printed and minted-there are an estimated 12 billion bills and 75 billion coins in circulation
in the euro-zone--and the logistical demands of their distribution), the national currency units
of the participating states will continue to exist until then. This period between January 1999
and January 2002 is called the transition period. Articles 5 through 9 of the regulation address
certain legal issues that are posed by the co-existence of the euro and the national currency
units during that time.' These provisions definitively establish the euro as the sole currency
of each participating state, with the national currency unit being merely a denomination of
(i.e., another way to express) the euro.' The relationship can be analogized to that between
the U.S. dollar and 55 or S10 bills.
Article 8 of the article 1091(4) regulation contains two other critical provisions. The first is set
forth in artide 8(3) and is often referred to as the "no compulsion/no prohibition" principle.! In
essence, when a payment originally denominated in a euro-zone currency is to be made by credit
to a bank account in the euro-zone, then notwithstanding the original denomination of the pay-
ment, the debtor may pay in euro.' The amount will appear in that account in the denomination
chosen by the creditor, with conversion to be made, at no charge, at the fixed irrevocable conver-
sion rate between that national currency unit and the euro announced on December 31, 1998. 9
Thus, the parties are neither compelled to use the euro nor prohibited from doing so.
The other critical provision of article 8 follows in paragraph (4), which gives member states,
and by extension private issuers, the power to change the denomination of their outstanding
debt obligations to euro. ' ° The decision that all new public sector debt issued after January 1,
1999, by euro-zone countries must be denominated in euro raised concerns that having old
debt denominated in the national currency units would hamper the overall liquidity of a country's
obligations and confuse investors. Article 8(4) remedies these concerns, and as they are not
limited to public sector debt, artide 8(4) also gives private issuers the right to redenominate
their debt if the government of the participating state in whose currency unit the debt originally
was denominated also has done so, provided that the underlying debt contract does not expressly
exclude redenomination. " SinceJanuary 1, 1999, all the participating states have redenominated
their debt into euro, and many private issuers are considering doing likewise. Most debt
agreements accommodate this change, and in fact throughout 1997 and 1998 there were
numerous issuances in the European markets of "tributary" bonds which were designed expressly
to be converted into euro once the third stage of EMU began.
The remainder of the article 1091(4) regulation addresses issues relating to bills and coins
and to the final conversion of references in legal instruments to national currency units to euro
which will occur at the end of the transition period on January 1, 2002. With this regulation
now in place, the legal framework for the euro at the European Community level is complete,
to be filled in at the participating state level by additional legislation as necessary.
4. See id. arts. 2-4.
5. Seeid. arts. 5-9.
6. Seeid.
7. Se id. an. 8(3).
8. See id.
9. Se id.
10. See id. art. 8(4).
11. See id.
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On the legislative front in the United States, Michigan and Pennsylvania passed EMU-related
legislation during 1998, joining New York, Illinois, and California. The legislation, which is
substantially similar in each state, codifies the positions that the euro is an acceptable substitute
for each participating country's currency and that its introduction will not have the effect of
altering or discharging any contract unless the contract explicitly so provides. Many legal scholars
believed that the introduction of the euro would not interfere with continuity of contracts,
even in the absence of legislation, on the basis of the legal principle that a country may choose
its own money (kx montae). Among the analyses that have concluded so is a comprehensive
survey" by Niall Lenihan, a lawyer with the European Central Bank, entitled "The Legal
Implications of European Monetary Union under U.S. and New York Law," which examined
kx montae as well as other legal theories and relevant case law. Nonetheless, the legislation
clarifies any residual uncertainty regarding the continuity of contracts governed by the laws
of those states and as such is a useful addition to the framework supporting the euro.
Another positive surprise in 1998 was the continuation of the almost unprecedented degree
of cooperation between private sector companies, trade associations, settlement systems ex-
changes, and governmental entities in laying the groundwork for the euro. This cooperation
occurred both in the operational arena, where institutions collaborated to assure smooth opera-
tion of support systems through the euro conversion, but also in the legal arena. Under the
auspices of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA), a trade association,
many financial institutions participated in an effort to find a solution to the vexing problem
of how to accommodate EMU and its resulting changes within existing legal agreements without
inundating each other, and the markets, with amendment requests. The result, called the ISDA
EMU Protocol, was a standard set of terms addressing five aspects of financial derivatives
contracts that are affected by EMU: continuity of contracts; replacement of price sources (e.g.,
local interest rates such as the Paris interbank offered rate for French franc borrowings that
might have been the basis for an interest rate swap but that are superseded by the introduction
of the euro); definition of business days; clarification of payment netting; and adjustment of
bond options (to take into account the possible redenomination of the underlying bonds). 3
As envisioned by the protocol, an institution could agree, or, in the language of the protocol,
adhere, to any one or more of these terms by submitting an adherence letter to ISDA. ISDA
would then post that adherence letter on its internet site, www.isda.org, and under the terms
of the protocol, that letter would constitute a bilateral offer to each other institution to amend
the relevant provisions of their master agreement accordingly. That offer could be accepted,
in whole or in part, by each other institution through its own adherence letter. If two parties'
adherence letters match on a particular set of terms, their master agreement is deemed amended
to that extent.
ISDA launched the EMU Protocol on May 1, 1998, and designated September 30 as the
last date by which institutions could adhere. The protocol was open both to ISDA member
institutions and to non-members. In the end, over 1,100 institutions adhered to the protocol,
with the vast majority agreeingto all terms. ISDA estimated that over 600,000 master agreements
were amended through this process. The efficiency of the process and the use of the internet
to accomplish the amendment has led to the protocol being hailed as the legal deal of the year
12. EuaOpEAN COMMISSION, EcONOMIC PAPER NUMBER 126 (1998).
13. See International Swaps & Derivatives Association, EMU Protocol (visited Mar. 17, 1999) <http://
www.isda.org/fprot95.pdf>.
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by one commentator 4 and as a model for how future amendments or even master agreements
should be structured. The Financial Markets Lawyers' Group and the British Bankers' Associa-
tion (BBA) picked up on the protocol and published a similar document to amend foreign
exchange master agreements, an effort that also was quite successful.
On a transactional level, a key development during 1998 was the introduction of Euribor,
the pan-euro zone interest rate for the euro that has replaced most of the participating countries'
interest rates, such as the previously mentioned Paris rate. Euribor is calculated based on the
rates quoted by fifty-seven banks in the euro-zone for borrowing in euro. It quickly has achieved
pre-eminence as the floating rate source for the euro in exchange-traded financial instruments
and over-the-counter financial derivatives contracts. Another interbank euro interest rate, Euro
Libor, which is published by the British Bankers' Association based on rates quoted by sixteen
banks in the London market, was initially expected to attract users based on the quality of
the quoting banks and the tradition behind Libor rates. Almost universal acceptance of Euribor
within the euro-zone, however, has upset those expectations. As a result, it is foreseeable that
multicurrency loan agreements in the United States increasingly will refer to Euribor as the
benchmark floating rate for euro borrowings.
As may be obvious from the fact that euro bills and coins do not exist yet, at this point
the euro is a currency of the financial markets. That is not to say, however, that it has had
a negligible impact. One half of all the international bonds issued in January 1999 were denomi-
nated in euro. By comparison, the percentage of international bonds denominated in the
participating countries' currencies collectively never exceeded thirty-five percent. EMU also
already has had a significant impact on the structure of the financial services industry in the
euro-zone, playing a large role in the rationale behind the Banco Santander-Banco Central
Hispano merger in Spain and Sociit Gknirale's proposed takeover of Paribas in France. With
the euro moving quickly toward reserve currency status, it is apparent that the financial markets
have not had any problem accepting the new currency.
For the last few years, the imminent introduction of the euro posed several unique legal
issues. The year 1998 marked the culmination of efforts to address those issues. Although it
certainly is too soon to tell about the overall success of EMU, it is not too soon to describe
the underlying legal work as such.
I!. The Russian Financial Crisis
In August 1998, the Russian government responded to its country's deepening currency
crisis by issuing a moratorium on payment of foreign debt and calling for a restructuring of
Russian sovereign debt obligations which, de facto, resulted in a default on $40 billion of
domestic bonds. The Russian government and Central Bank of Russia (CBR) issued a joint
press release on August 17, 1998,"5 that announced the debt moratorium which suspended
payments for 90 days, from August 17 to November 14, 1998, in foreign currency by Russian
legal entities to foreign creditors involving certain transactions. On September 9, 1998, the
CBR published Directive No. 344-u "On Suspension of Payments from Residents to Non-
Residents under the Forward Currency Contracts."' 6 This directive formalized the joint press
14. Christopher Stoakes, Inmene Reomne 100 Lawyer, EuaoMoNEY, Jan. 1999, at 2 1.
15. Gowrnmant & Ctral Bank Decdm A bnge Rate Poiy, ITAR-TASS News Agency, Aug. 17, 1998,
availabk in LEXIS NEWS Library, NON-US File [hereinafter Exhge Rat Policy].
16. CENemAL BANK OF RUSSIA, ON SUSPNSION OF PAYMENTS FROM REsmerrs To NoN-Rgsusts UmE
THa FORWARD CuRRaNcY CoNTRACTS (Sept. 9, 1998).
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release issued the prior month which did not define the term foreign currency contract but
was interpreted to indude transactions involving the transfer of foreign currency with a settlement
date of three days or more from trade date.
The August 17, 1998, joint press release also announced a restructuring of federal debt
which President Ydtsin formalized in Decree No. 9887 on August 25, 1998. This decree
authorized the Russian government to develop an unspecified restructuring program for existing
debt obligations and a procedure for issuing new debt obligations. The Russian government
issued Decree No. 1007" on that same day. The decree called for the premature redemption
of any GKOs (short-term couponless treasury notes) and OFZs (Federal coupon bonds) which
went into circulation prior to August 17, 1998 and that had a term expiring by December
31, 1999. The initial GKO/OFZ Restructuring Program sought to redeem those bonds by
September 25, 1998, and, in turn, issue new government securities which would have a much
longer term and much lower yield than the redeemed GKOs and OFZs bonds.
At the end of September 1998, the foreign holders of the affected Russian debt scrambled
to renegotiate a better deal with the Russian government whose GKO/OFZ redemption offer
would give creditors approximately ten percent of the value of the redeemed bonds. Lehman
Brothers, the U.S. investment bank, won a United Kingdom court order granting an injunction
against two Russian banks resulting in a freeze of 5113 million held by Inkimbank and Onexim-
bank. Lehman daimed to have acted on behalf of clients whose forward foreign exchange
contracts were in doubt because of Russian counterparties' unwillingness or inability to fulfill
their contractual obligations.
Foreign investors also threatened to declare a default on Russia's other outstanding debt
instruments, Eurobonds, and MinFin bonds, in order to force a general renegotiation of the
terms of the GKO/OFZ Restructuring Program. In particular, foreign creditors looked at cross
default dauses in their documentation in order to provoke a general default. As the 90-day
moratorium on commercial debt repayments expired on November 14, 1998, groups of foreign
banks held negotiations with the Russian Government to restructure the Russian debt to be
redeemed.
In the end of December, Russia defaulted in part on $30 billion Soviet-era debt owed to
the London Club of commercial bank creditors. The cash payment due on the principal loans
(PRINs) was not made although the cash payment due on the interest arrears notes (IANs)
was paid. At the beginning of 1999, negotiations were ongoing between Vneshekonombank,
the foreign trade bank for the former Soviet Union responsible for the debt, and Bank of
America, the Restructuring agent for the London Club. In addition, Bank of America informed
Vneshekonombank that the London Club creditors were reserving their rights under the loan
agreements rather than exercising them pending further negotiations.
III. Canadian Banking Law Reform
During 1998 the first official report was published describing an approach to regulation of
Canada's financial services sector in the next millenium. 1998 was also the year in which
17. Se E.asagr Rate Poiiy, spra note 15; w aho Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No.
988 of Aug. 25, 1998 on Some Measures to Stabilize the Financial System of the Russian Federation, avai/a/k
in LEXIS, INTLAW library, RFLAW File.
18. Se Decision of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1007 of Aug. 25, 1998, on Redeeming
State Short-Term Non-Coupon Bonds & Federal Borrowing Bonds with Constant & Variable Coupon Yield
Maturing Before Dec. 31, 1999, & Issued Before Aug. 17, 1998, avaiahbkin LEXIS, INTLAW Library, RFLAW
File.
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proposals for two mergers were tabled, involving four of the country's five largest banks. The
merger proposals came at a time when the government's schedule for dealing with financial
services policy was at an early stage. In interrupting that schedule, they reminded the government
of the changes which had already occurred and were continuing in financial services, in terms
of both international developments and rapid technological change. Even though the mergers
were not allowed to proceed, they stimulated extensive discussion of the issues involved, and
in so doing highlighted the necessary policy choices.
In the previous decade there had been very considerable change (including consolidation)
in the financial services industry generally, and the Canadian Federal Government had struggled
to keep up. At first there was a willingness to recognize the new realities: the 1992 legislative
revisions to the Bank Act (and other statutes governing federally regulated financial institutions)9
allowed cross ownership among the "four pillars" and broadened business powers across the
financial services sector. The marketplace used these authorities aggressively, and the shape of
the sector changed significantly by 1997, when the legislation again came up for review."0
However, this hopeful beginning was not followed through-in the 1997 revisions a number
of significant regulatory changes were postponed, in the expectation that broader study, and
a vision, of the evolution of the financial sector should guide further important regulatory
developments. In the meantime the technological revolution in financial services delivery systems
continued. And there was increasing competition in banking from both domestic and foreign
non-banks. Foreign banks, on the other hand, remained unable to operate directly in the
domestic market, 1 even while their consolidation, especially in the United States, continued.
In this environment the pressures on Canadian financial services policy continued to grow,
both domestically and internationally.
As part of its efforts to establish a broader context for policy, the government established
a task force in December 1996," which in turn set a deadline of September 1998 for delivering
a report which was to be the foundation for the government's promised "comprehensive review
of the appropriate framework for the financial sector in the 21st century." More specifically,
19. See Bank Act, R.S.C., Ch. B-I (1985) (Can.); Trust Companies Act, R.S.C., ch. T-20 (1985) (Can.);
Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C., ch. 1-12 (1985) (Can.); Cooperative Credit Associations
Act, R.S.C., ch. C-41 (1985) (Can.). Beginning with the 1992 regulatory revisions, an attempt was made to
coordinate review and revision of these statutes with bank powers under the Bank Act, so that all institutions
would to the extent possible be on a "level playing field." Legislation and regulations in respect of federal financial
institutions are available at the website of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) (visited
Mar. 18, 1999) <http://www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/AndreE/Legisla.htm>.
20. Only vestiges of the "four pillats"-banking, insurance, securities, and trusts-remained. The large banks
in particular had acquired the largest Canadian securities dealers and [most] trust company assets and/or businesses,
and had significant interests in the insurance industry. In addition to cross ownership, cooperation on operational
matters (e.g. outsourcing) and networking among financial institutions were accepted, though regulated, facts of
life. See, e.g., Bank Act § 468 (cross ownership). OSFI, Policy Starentm # 1997-02/Outsouridng of Business Functiosm
by FRFI's (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http:www.osfi-bsif.gc.ca/outgoing/pdf/outsource/paf>; Securities Act, §
229 (networking by securities dealer registrants with other financial institutions).
21. Banking licenses are only given to subsidiary operations, under full supervision of OSFI. See Bank Act
pt. XII.
22. The Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial Services Sector. The antecedent report on
which the Task Force was based was the White Paper 1997 Review of Financial Sector Legislation: Proposals for
Changes, Ministry of Finance, Canada (June, 1996), which set out primary objectives for the 1997 round of
legislative changes (strengthening consumer protection and easing the regulatory burden). The report and related
material are available at the website of the Task Force. See <http://fmservtaskforce.fin.gc.ca/indexe.htm >.
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it was to provide the basis for the legislative changes to be enacted in the next review of federal
financial services legislation (mandated to occur in 2002)."3
In this context, 1998 opened with the announcement on January 23 by Royal Bank and
Bank of Montreal of their intention to carry out a "merger of equals" as soon as regulatory
approvals were obtained. And on April 17 the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and
the Toronto-Dominion Bank added a request for approval of a merger of their own. These
announcements ran counter to the policy-which had not been specifically articulated in statute
or regulation-that "big shall not buy big.
' 24
As a legal matter, there were two primary regulatory processes involved in consideration
of the mergers. First, it was necessary that the Competition Bureau review the merger proposals
and determine if they were "likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially." 2' Secondly,
it was necessary that the Minister of Finance give his approval.26 In addition, the September
report of the task force (now known as the MacKay Task Force) was identified by the minister
as a key context for his decision.
Of these, the MacKay Task Force Report appeared first, on September 15, 1998. 27 It took
no position directly on the merger proposals, but among its 124 recommendations2" it advocated
relaxing the informal policy that "big shall not buy big," in favor of a case-by-case review on
the merits. On the other hand, the report also recommended an expanded process for considering
large mergers, which would include a formal Public Interest Review Process, and mechanics
for the making and enforcement of undertakings (induding undertakings made during the
process) by the proposed merger partners.2"
23. See Bank Act § 21.
24. When the proposal by Royal Bank and Bank of Montreal was announced, the most recent pronouncement
on the topic had been in July of 1997. At that point, in response to a question posed on an urgent basis by
government, the task force (which had just published an outline of the issues it would address in its September
1998 report) advocated abandonment of the "big shall not buy big" principle as a general rule, with provisos,
but specifically excluding from its consideration the Schedule I (widely owned) banks. Letter from Pierre Y.
Ducros, Interim Chairman of the Task Force, to The Honourable James Peterson, Secretary of State for Interna-
tional Financial Institutions (July 11, 1997) <http://www.fin.gc.ca/newse97/data/97-O58lete.html >. The provi-
sos to removal of the "big shall not buy big" constraint were that actual approvals should be on a case-by-case
basis, and in particular should be subject to satisfaction of all competitive concerns, and that proper attention
should be given in each case to safety and soundness and the public interest (further identified as involving impacts
on international competitiveness, customers, employment, and adoption of innovative technologies). See id.
25. See S. 92(1) of the Cmnpettio Act (Canada). Under normal procedures the bureau would discuss its
findings with the proposed merger partners, to allow for problem areas to be dealt with by changes to the merger
proposal. Under S. 92, the bureau has the power to seek an order from the Competition Tribunal blocking
proposed mergers, or requiring divestiture in cases where the merger is already completed. The Minister of Finance
is empowered to exempt a bank merger from the exercise of these powers (although in this case he had stated
that he was unlikely to do so).
26. Sections 223-23 1 govern the arrangements under which mergers, known as "amalgamations," are effected.
See Bank Act §§ 223-31. The act also provides for ministerial approval. See id. § 225.
27. See Cbange, OaLknge and Opportunity Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial
Services Sector (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://fnservtaskforce.fn.g.ca/rpt/pdf/main.E.pdf>.
28. The 124 recommendations were grouped around four key themes: enhancing competition and competitive-
ness (including further powers for life insurance companies, establishment of a holding company structure, and
sector-wide ownership rules retaining widely held Canadian ownership requirements for large institutions); empow-
ering consumers (including further disclosure and privacy requirements, and expansion of tied selling prohibitions);
Canadians' expectations and corporate conduct (including better access to financial services by consumers-but
generally avoiding increased formal regulatory requirements or processes); and improving the regulatory framework
(broadening the powers exercised by OSFI as the regulator of federal financial institutions). See id.
29. The recommendations on merger policy and process are numbered 45-52. See id. at 205-08.
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Parliament also contributed to the process, in the form of reports on the MacKay Task
Force by committees in the House of Commons and in the Senate." Again, neither of the
reports took any position directly on the merger proposals. While the Senate committee was
generally supportive of the MacKay proposals, in relation to mergers its report31 proposed
limiting the "big shall not buy big" condition to acquisitions/mergers involving a large bank
and a large life insurance company. It also discussed the process for merger approval-and
stressed that the process must run on "a fairly tight timetable," and be predictable and objective.'
The House report also generally concurred with the MacKay Report's recommendations."
While these commentaries were relatively objective and used a macro approach to financial
services sector regulation, a reminder of the political context came from another review under-
taken by the National Caucus Task Force.' 4 The resulting report also looked at all aspects of
financial services policy, and included a recommendation that the mergers not be approved."
These reports set the stage for the first two weeks in December, during which the Office of
the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) as the banking regulator and the Competition
Bureau delivered their comments and report, and in which the Minister of Finance announced
his final decision. OSFI's letter of December 1036 responded to the minister's request for any
prudential reasons why the merger proposals should not be approved. OSFI was not able to
identify any prudential issues which in its view precluded approval. However, OSFI did indicate
that dealing with any financial difficulties arising in either merged entity could create additional
problems, because restructuring these larger entities might either create competition concerns
(in relation to any domestic buyer) or other ownership difficulties (if buyers had to be solicited
from outside of Canada).
The Competition Bureau (which had in July published guidelines for assessing the mergers) 7
delivered its findings to the proposed merger partners and also to the Minister of Finance on
30. The House Standing Committee on Finance and the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade
and Commerce.
31. See A Bluprint for Change: Respoe to the Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Canadian Financial
Sm r Swtor (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www.fm.gc.ca/bnks/bankse.htm1>.
32. See id., §§ 338-40.
33. See Tb Future Stam Now: A Sndy on t& Finanial Sevce Scor in Canada 16-20 (visited Mar. 19, 1999)
<http://www.par.gc.ca/InFoComDoc/36/I/FINA/Studies/Reports/fmarp/2-c.htm>.
34. This group of members of the Liberal Caucus (Members of the House of Commons belonging to the
ruling Liberal Party) was formed shortly before announcement of the mergers, to look into financial services in
Canada, largely from the public's (consumer) viewpoint. Many hearings were held across the country by what
came to be known as the "Ianno Committee" (for Chairman Tony Ianno). After the mergers were announced,
a main focus of the committee (as reflected in Chapter One of its report) was consideration of the mergers.
35. See National Liberal Caucus Task Force, A Baknce of Inter . Arms aid Fairness to Canadian; in the
21st Century (visited Mar. 19, 1999) < http://www.intedog.com/ianno/fnal.report.en.pdf>. Ultimately, this
document was signed by over fifty members of parliament and senators.
36. See Office of The Superintendant of Financial Institutions Report to the Minister of Finance: Propsed
Mergert Between the RoalW Bank of Canada and the Bank of Montrea4 and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commnerce
and th Tronto-Dominon Bank (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www.fin.gc.c/OSFI/asfirpt-e.html>.
37. See Competition Bureau, Merger Enforcment Guidins as Applied to a Bank Merger, (visited Mar. 19,
1999) [hereinafter The Guidelines] < http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/cto 1280e.html >. The guidelines departed from
regular merger review practice in that they did not envisage immediate discussion between the bureau and the
merging parties regarding ways (normally asset sales and restructuring of the merger proposal) in which any the
competitive concerns could be addressed. Rather, in light of the powers of the Minister of Finance, the findings
would be transmitted with general indications of the types of remedies that had historically been utilized, which
could then be discussed further if appropriate in the context of the terms of the decision of the Minister of
Finance. The bureau's website also has other general information regarding the mergers. See id.
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December 11 . The bureau found that each of the mergers was "likely to lead to a substantial
lessening or prevention of competition that would cause higher prices and lower levels of service
and choice for several key banking services in Canada." '39 The businesses identified where these
effects arose were certain local markets' in each of the areas selected for further review: branch
banking services to individuals and businesses, credit cards and securities.
As the final step, the Minister of Finance announced on December 14 that neither merger
would be allowed to proceed.4 ' The minister cited in particular an "unacceptable" concentration
of power, a "significant reduction" in competition, and a reduction in "the government's policy
flexibility to address potential future prudential concerns." It was a response that was certainly
unwelcome to the four banks involved, and at the same time committed the government to
implementing a new framework, identified by the minister as addressing a broad range of issues
in relation to the financial services sector. 2 Specifically with regard to future merger proposals,
he said that no merger among major banks would be considered until the new policy framework
was in place-and, even then, that a positive response would depend on a showing that the
concerns he had identified had been addressed.
IV. Enforcement of Claims Against Foreign Debtors
In Elliot Associates LP. v. Peru & Banco de la Nacion, the United States District Court in the
Southern District of New York dismissed the daim brought by Elliot43 to recover monies due
and owing on Peruvian debt it acquired by assignment in the secondary capital markets. Banco
de la Nacion is the principal debtor and the Republic of Peru had provided a guarantee of
payment of that debt. Although the Republic of Peru and Banco de la Nacion (the defendants)
38. Letters of December 11, 1998, from Konrad von Finckenstein (Director of Investigation and Research,
the Competition Bureau) to Mr. Qeghom (RBC) and Mr. Barrett (BMO) and to Mr. Flood (CIBC) and Mr.
Baillie (ID), copied in each case to Mr. Martin (Minister of Finance). Available through the bureau's website.
See id.
39. In relation to the merger analysis, as of December 31, 1997, in terms of value of Canadian assets, Royal
Bank and Bank of Montreal were first and third (aggregating CS 315 billion), and CIBC and TD were second
and fifth (aggregating CS275 billion). While there were very significant variations in the markets which the two
mergers were found to affect (and in general the RBC/BMO merger created more competitive issues), the differences
were insufficiently substantial to have any impact on the government's response, which did not significantly
differentiate between the two.
40. The guidelines provided that the initial screening for possible competition issues would be done by using
the forward sonation areas defined by the first three digits of the postal code. See The Guidelines, supra note
37. There are 1,500 such areas in Canada. Other material aspects of the reviews included: (a) assessment of the
two mergers would be done on the basis of their aggregate effect on the market, rather than by analyzing the
effects of the merger fsrst proposed, and then proceeding to the second, as had previously been the case; (b) the
possible impact of developing electronic distribution channels (and any other innovations) on competition was
to be determined on the previously used two year time frame (and branch banking continued to be an important
aspect of banking); and (c) any efficiency defenses in situations where a "strong likelihood of substantial prevention
or lessening of competition" was found would have to be considered before the Competition Tribunal (i.e. the
bureau would not agree with such a defense without a full hearing).
41. See News Release 98-124, Statement by the Honorabk Paul Martin, Minister of Finance on the Bank
Merger /roposals (visited Mar. 19, 1999) <http://www.fn.gc.ca/newse98/98-124e.html>. See also <htp://
www.fin.gc.ca/fin-eng.html > (containing other related items).
42. In committing the government to "move quickly," the minister identified six policy objectives: fostering
jobs and economic growth; responding to the needs of consumers and small businesses; ensuring the sector continues
to be financially sound and secure; promotion of competition by allowing new entrants, both in Canada and
from abroad; enabling the sector to maintain leading edge technology; and allowing for strong Canadian institutions
with a solid international presence. See id.
43. See Elliot Assoc. v. Peru, 12 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y 1998).
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did not contest the existence of the debt or the default on payment, the defendants successfully
asserted a defense based on the common law principle of "champerty" that has been adopted
in New York'sJudiciary Law at section 489." The court held that Elliott's assignment contracts
violated section 489, could not be enforced, and dismissed Elliot's complaint with costs and
disbursements to the defendants.
Section 489 makes unlawful the purchase of debt "with the intent and for the purpose of bring-
ing an action or proceeding thereon."" The policy behind section 489 is to disallow litigation
based on a right acquired solely to bring an action. The court construed section 489 to require
the defendants to prove that there was no other purposes for the purchase of the debt except to
bring an action. The court held that the defendants had presented dear and convincing evidence
that Elliot had purchased the debt with the intent and sole purpose to sue to recover 100 percent
of the value of the debt. The defendants' proofinduded: Elliot's investment strategywhich focused
on sovereign debt acquisition and filinglawsuits; the past business activities of individuals working
on Elliot's Peruvian debt project which included similar sovereign debt acquisition and subsequent
litigation; Elliot's delay in closingthe Peruvian debt trades until after all litigation risks were clarified
by the Second Circuit in the Pravin Banker matter, another Peruvian debt holder who did not
participate in the Peruvian debt restructuring agreement; and Elliot's refusal to negotiate with the
debtor after its purchases of the Peruvian debt. In addition, the court did not find persuasive any
of Elliot's alternative reasons for why it acquired the Peruvian debt. Elliot has filed an appeal with
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Both the Bond Market Association (BMA) and the Loan Syndication & Trading Association
Inc. (LSTA) have filed Amius Curiae briefs with the Second Circuit arguing against the district
court's interpretation and application of section 489 in this case. Both the BMA and the LSTA
argued that the court departed from legal precedent and misconstrued section 489 in finding
that Elliot's intent and purpose in purchasing the Peruvian debt was solely to sue for full
payment. In addition, the LSTA stressed that the court's decision could adversely impact the
secondary loan market's ability to create liquidity that enables lenders to reduce the risk and
allows banks and other lenders to-extend credit. The BMA emphasized its purpose in submitting
its brief was to preserve the principle of the enforceability of contracts legally entered into in
the fixed income markets which includes the rule that contracts are freely assignable absent
dear contractual language prohibiting assignment. The BMA urged the Second Circuit to
consider whether it is appropriate to apply section 489 in the context of commercial transactions
involving the fixed income markets. In particular, the BMA warned that section 489 could
be used by debtors routinely or conveniently to challenge the enforcement of debts due and
payable that were acquired in the secondary market.
In another case of interest to U.S. persons with claims against foreign debtors, the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari in A//ianw Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gnpo Mexican de Dsarr/llo, S.A.,
No. 98-23 1, to decide whether a district court may freeze assets in an action solely for monetary
relief, where the assets are located abroad and are unrelated to the damages claims advanced
in the lawsuit."
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. (GMD) participated in a Mexican government program
that granted toll road concessions to companies that arranged private financing of intercity
44. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 489 (McKinney 1983) [hereinafter Section 489].
45. Section 489, supra note 44.
46. See Alliance Bond Fund, Inc. v. Grupo Mexicano de Desarroilo, 143 F.3d 688 (2nd Cir. 1998).
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highway construction. In February 1994, GMD offered and sold $250 million of 8.25 percent
notes due in 2001. Eleven investment funds in the United States (investors) purchased $75
million of the notes. In August 1997, GMD defaulted on the investors' notes. The Mexican
government offered a bailout by promising GMD S 309 million in government guaranteed Toll
Road Notes in return for eventual government ownership of the toll roads. GMD planned to
assign all but $5.5 million of the notes to creditors other than the investors.
The investors filed suit in the Southern District of New York seeking monetary damages
for breach of contract and a preliminary injunction restraining GMD from assigning or otherwise
transferring the Toll Road Notes. A federal district court may issue a preliminary injunction
freezing assets when the assets are the subject matter of a pending equitable action. 7
The district court preliminady enjoined GMD from transferring the Notes, and the Second
Circuit affiimed. The court of appeals observed that the Investors' right to recover a monetary
judgment would be defeated if GMD were able to transfer its Toll Road Notes assets to other
creditors. The Second Circuit also was "impressed by England's successful twenty-year history
of issuing 'Mareva injunctions' under circumstances substantially similar to those present on
appeal." Accordingly, the court held that a preliminary injunction was authorized under a
district court's "general equitable power to ensure the preservation of an adequate remedy."'"
The Second Circuit expressly noted a circuit split on this issue. The First, Third, Fourth,
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all held that a district court can enjoin a
defendant's assets in an action for monetary relief. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have reached a contrary condusion. The Second Circuit's decision arguably is in tension with
De Bern Consolidated Mina, Ltd v. United States, ° which rejected the proposition that "[e]very
suitor who resorts to chancery for any sort of relief by injunction may, on a mere statement
of belief that the defendant can easily make away with or transport his money or goods, impose
.an injunction on him, indefinite in duration, disabling him to use so much of his funds or
property as the court deems necessary for security or compliance with its possible decree."'
1
This case is of importance to institutional investors and other potential creditors of interna-
tional and domestic firms. Under the minority view, financially troubled corporations can easily
evade daims for monetary relief by transferring all assets prior to final judgment. Institutional
investors and other businesses that deal with financially vulnerable foreign and domestic compa-
nies will want to stay informed about this case.
V. Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Bankruptcy Laws
In a highly significant case under the U.S. bankruptcy laws, Hong Kong & Sbangbai Banking
Corp. v. Simon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a foreign creditor
may not bring a foreign collection proceeding against a debtor that has obtained a discharge
under the bankruptcy law.' In so doing, the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the extraterritorial
effect of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSB) had extended a U.S. $24 million loan to Odyssey
International Holdings, Ltd., an international company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.
47. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
48. ALana Bond Fund, 143 F.3d at 696.
49. d at 694.
S0. De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).
51. Id. at 222.
52. See Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon, 153 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 1998).
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William Neil Simon, Odyssey's principal shareholder, personally guaranteed the loan. The
guarantee provided for enforcement under the laws of Hong Kong in the courts of Hong
Kong.
When the loan went into default, HSB called upon Simon to pay under his personal guarantee.
At the time, Simon had personal debts of over U.S. $200 million, so he travelled to the United
States and filed a personal bankruptcy petition under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
HSB filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding with respect to a separate 5 37
million loan to Simon. It did not, however, file a proof of claim with respect to Simon's
personal guarantee.
The U.S. bankruptcy court entered an order granting Simon a discharge of all his debts.
The order contained an injunction against all creditors instituting any action to collect the
debts of Simon. Shortly thereafter, HSB sought a declaratory judgment from the bankruptcy
court to the effect that the discharge and injunction were not effective outside the United
States. Evidently, the bank intended to file suit against Simon in the courts of Hong Kong.
The bankruptcy court dismissed HSB's complaint for a declaratory judgment and the U.S.
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court.
The Ninth Circuit has now affirmed both lower courts. The appellate court noted that the
Bankruptcy Code confers jurisdiction over the debtor's property "wherever located and by
whomever held."" Thus, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction in rem over all the property
in the debtor's estate. This includes property outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. Accordingly, a U.S. bankruptcy court has the power to enjoin a creditor from proceeding
against the debtor's property before and after discharge of the debtor. The creditor's remedy
is to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court.
The Ninth Circuit also noted that the discharge and injunction did not apply to the courts
of Hong Kong. Rather, it applies to the foreign creditor, in this case HSB, which is subject
to the jurisdiction of the U.S. bankruptcy court. If HSB were to ignore the injunction (by
bringing suit in the Hong Kong courts), it would be subject to the imposition of sanctions by
the U.S. court.
HSB had argued that principles of international comity dictate that the discharge and injunc-
tion should not apply to foreign proceedings. However, the Ninth Circuit found that considera-
tions of international comity only apply where there is a conflict of jurisdictions. Here, an
insolvency proceeding had not been initiated against Simon in Hong Kong or anywhere else.
The U.S. bankruptcy proceeding was the only one in effect. Thus, the court held that interna-
tional comity did not prevent the bankruptcy court from entering its injunction.
As a consequence of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Simon, if a foreign creditor is doing
business in the United States and its debtor files for bankruptcy in the United States, it must
look to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code for its remedies.
VI. Rights Of Holders of American Depository Receipts
May the holder of American Depository Receipts (ADRs) reflecting ownership of shares in
a Japanese corporation bring a shareholder derivative action on behalf of that corporation?
Both U.S. and Japanese law provide for shareholder derivative actions. However, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held in Batcbelder v. Kawamoto that underJapanese
5 3. Id. at 996.
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law, which applied to the ADRs in question, the holder of the ADRs did not have standing
to bring the derivative action. 4
The plaintiff, Harry Batchelder, owned 1,246 ADRs each of which represented ten shares
of stock in Honda Motor Company, Ltd., the Japanese automobile company. The ADRs were
issued by Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York acting as depository. By purchasing
the ADRs, Batchelder was able to invest in the Japanese company.
Batchelder brought the present action alleging that the directors of Honda Japan breached
their fiduciary duties by failing to protect the company from bribery and kickback schemes
perpetrated by certain employees of Honda's American subsidiary. The directors of Honda's
American subsidiary were also named in the suit in what is known as a "double derivative" action,
i.e., an action brought by a shareholder of a parent company, on behalf of that corporation, to
enforce a cause of action in favor of the subsidiary company.
Honda maintained that Batchelder did not have standing to bring either derivative action
because under Japanese law only shareholders, not holders of ADRs, may bring derivative
actions. Batchelder purchased his ADRs under a deposit agreement with Morgan Guaranty
and Honda Japan. The deposit agreement contained a choice of law clause which read as
follows:
This Deposit Agreement and the [American Depository] Receipts and all rights hereunder and
thereunder and provisions hereof and thereof shall be governed by and construed in accordance
with the laws of the State of New York, United States of America. It is understood that notwithstand-
ing any present or future provision of the laws of the State of New York, the rights of holders
of Stock and other Deposited Securities, and the duties and obligations of the Company in respect
of such holders, as such, shall be governed by the laws of Japan."
The Ninth Circuit held that under the second sentence of this choice of law clause, Japanese
law governs the rights of holders of ADRs in Honda Japan. While Article 267 of the Japanese
Commercial Code allows for a derivative action in the name of a Japanese company, the Ninth
Circuit found, on the basis of expert testimony, that only shareholders have rights under Article
267 and dismissed the case.
Batchdder argued that he was never given a copy of and never consented to the deposit
agreement. In response, the Ninth Circuit quoted a number of SEC releases to the effect that:
[T]he deposit agreement constitutes the contract between the issuer of the deposited securities,
the depository and the holders of ADRs. "ADR holders are deemed to have agreed to all terms
in the deposit agreement by their acceptance and holding of ADRs.'
6
The holding in Batcbelder may seem to be inequitable in that the plaintiff did not have his
day in court. However, the case is significant in that it upholds the validity of choice of law
clauses in financial contracts.
VII. Sales of Securities in the United States
In a world of global finance and capital flows, the extraterritorial reach of national securities
laws needs to be dearly defined. In America, this is not the case. The absence of legislative
guidelines has spawned considerable litigation.
54. See Batchdder v. Kawamoto, 147 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 1998).
55. Id. at 918.
56. Id. at 919.
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The latest case, Europe & Oveneas Commodity Traden, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, involved
the sale of shares in a Luxembourg bond futures fund by the London office of Paribas." Shares
in the fund were sold by Paribas mostly outside the United States. However, Europe and
Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. (EOC), a Panamanian investment company, purchased its
shares in the fund on the basis of telephone calls and other communications to its principal,
Alan Carr, a Canadian citizen, while Carr was visiting Florida.
When its investment in the fund lost money, EOC sued Paribas in federal court in New
York alleging violation of U.S. securities laws because the shares in the fund had never been
registered with the SEC and Carr had been misled by Paribas officials. On June 4, 1998, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed EOC's suit, holding that
phone calls and facsimiles to a person temporarily on U.S. soil are not sufficient to provide a
basis for jurisdiction under the U.S. securities laws. In so doing, the Second Circuit narrowed
somewhat the scope of U.S. securities laws over international transactions.
EOC had two daims: the first was that Paribas had sold it unregistered securities in violation
of the Securities Act of 1933. The SEC has issued Regulation S in order to define the circum-
stances under which trans-national securities offerings need to be registered with the SEC.
Regulation S provides that a sale of securities "outside the United States" is exempt from the
registration requirement." In determining when a sale occurs outside the United States, the
court held that the "conduct" and "effects" tests should be applied." These tests have been
used by courts in suits under the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. Applying these
tests to the registration requirement, the court found that there was insufficient conduct in
the United States to invoke the jurisdiction of the 1933 Act. Paribas did not intend to create
a market in the United States for the fund's shares. The sale to Carr was an isolated transaction.
Thus, there was no significant effect in the United States either.
These tests were also relevant to EOC's daim against Paribas under the anti-fraud provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. As stated by the Second Circuit: "the surrounding
circumstances show that no relevant interest of the United States was implicated. In other
words, a series of calls to a transient foreign national in the United States is not enough to
establish jurisdiction under the conduct test without some additional factor tipping the scales
in favor of our jurisdiction." 6"
In effect, the court is saying that Paribas' solicitation of Carr while he was in his vacation
home in Florida was de minimis. There was no pattern of solicitation of U.S. residents and
no harm was done to U.S. securities markets. But this outcome leaves open the question how
much solicitation is enough to justify jurisdiction in the United States.
57. See Europe & Overseas Commodity Traders v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 118 (2nd Cir. 1998)
58. Id. at 124.
59. Id. at 125.
60. Id. at 129.
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